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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the Nash equilibria to a game where a 
discrete public good is to be provided. Each individual may 
participate by making a fixed contribution. If a sufficient number of 
contributions are made, the good is provided. Otherwise, the good is 
not provided. One variant of the rules allows for contributions to be 
refunded when the good is not provided, For pure strategies, we find 
that the Nash equilibria with a refund are a superset of those without 
a refund, For both rules, the efficient number of players 
contributing is an equilibrium, For mixed strategies, to every 
equilibrium without a refund, there is a corresponding equilibrium 
with a refund with a higher number of e.xpected contributors. Mixed 
strategy equilibria "disappear" as the number of players grows large. 
Some results reported in the experimental literature are discussed in 
light of these theoretical results. 
PARTICIPATION AND THE.PROVISION OF DISCRETE PUBLIC GOODS: 
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 
Thomas Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal 
I. INTRODUCTION• 
Participation games are games in which members of a team 
pursue a common but costly goal. The decision problem the group faces 
is how to share the costs of achieving the goal. The group must 
confront the well-known incentive problem where each member of the 
group is tempted to free ride, hoping that other members of the group 
will pay the cost. In Palfrey and Rosenthal (1982) we formally 
defined participation games and analyzed games with two teams that are 
akin to elections and referenda. 
In these games each member of each team had to decide whether 
to vote. If one team had more members voting than did the other team, 
its members each received a reward of one. The members of the losing 
team each got zero. However, it cost c, 0 < c < 1 to vote. The basic 
payoffs were 
1 Non-voters on winning team 
1-c Voters on winning team 
0 
-c 
Non-voters on losing team 
Voters on losing team. 
Two alternative rules for dealing with ties were explored. 
For both rules, we obtained identical asymptotic results. With large 
number of voters, we found only two types of Nash equilibria; one 
where nearly no one voted and another in which turnout was 
approximately twice the membership of the smaller team. 
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An important special case of these team games arises when 
there is only one team. The game then models a discrete public good 
problem. If at least one member of the team contributes (votes) the 
good (worth 1 to everyone) is provided. Otherwise, everyone receives 
zero.1 
More general versions of one team games with discrete public 
goods and fixed contributions occur in the real world. Some examples 
follow. (A) A new coffee pot for an office of SO employees costs t3o. 
If at least 30 employees contribute t1, the purchase will be made. 
(In this case, transaction costs might preclude requests for variable 
contributions.) (D) If 10 percent of the registered voters sign a 
petition at the city hall, a referendum is held on some issue. (C) 
Fifty people see an assault taking place. If one person calls the 
police, the victim is saved. 
In this paper, we formally generalize the one team game as 
follows. 
1. There are M players each with pure strategies, denoted si, of 
either contributing a fixed amount (si = 1) or not contributing at 
all (si = O). 
We denote the number of contributors necessary to produce the 
public good by w and the actual number of contributors by m. We 
consider two slightly different "rules" of the game, !!..Q. refund (R) and 
refund (R). 
2. (Rl If m 2. w and 
If m 2. w and 
If m < w and 
If m < w and 
s. 1, 1 i receives 1-c 
Si 0, receives 1 
Si 1, i receives -c 
Si 0, i receives 0 
Under the no refund rule, a player who contributes does not get a 
refund if the public good isn 't provided. This is contrasted with a 
simple refund rule in which contributions are fully refunded if the 
public good is not provided, 
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• 
( R) If m 2. w and Si 1, i receives 1-c
m 2. w and Si 0, i receives 1 
If m < w and s. 1 1 or 0, i receives o .
Version (2' .)  was suggested b y  Simmons e t  al. (1981) and van 
de Kragt et al. ( 1982), following earlier work by Brubaker (1975), 
Coombs (1973), and Bohm (1971). An interpretation of their game is 
that the players are asked to contribute toward the public good. 2 
They are told that if at least w contributions are made, the good will 
be produced, Otherwise, all contributions will be refunded. These 
authors interpret the removal of the -c payoff from (2,) as removing 
the ttfeartt motivation for free riding, Whereas (2.) has both a 
ngreedn and a ttfearn motivation, (2'. ) has only a ngreedn motivation. 
Their conjecture is that the refund rule will produce superior 
allocations to the no refund rule because the free rider problem is 
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partially overcome in this way. In an attempt to formalize and verify 
this conjecture, we eschew these psychological connotations and simply 
analyze and compare the Nash equilibria of both games. In addition to 
characterizing the equilibria, we examine limiting properties with a 
large number of players. We then use our results to analyze the data 
from two sets of experiments. 
II. EQUILIDRIUM ANALYSIS 
We analyze equilibria that can be characterized by a partition 
of the M players into three groups: 
Gl If i B Gl, s. 1 1, so i contributes 
G2 If B a2' s. 0, so i does not contribute1 
G3 If i B if. i has s i = 1 with probability q, 
so i uses a mixed strategy. 
Note that we impose symmetry in mixed strategies. There is no 
' 
3 subscript in G • 
Case I. No Refund (RJ • 
Ia. lo3 I = O. (Pure strategy equilibria. ) 
Proposition 1. If w = 1, there are M pure strategy equilibria, each 
with one contributor and M-1 non-contributors. If w ) 1, there are 
(M) pure strategy equilibria each with w contributors and one w 
equilibrium with no contributors. These equilibria exhaust the pure 
strategy equilibria. 
Proof: Obvious. 
Jb. lo31 F O. (Sy11DDetric mixed strategy equilibria,) To analyze 
this case requires the following definitions: 
k 
j 
3 m 
lo11 
lo21 
Number of contributors in G3, 
and, for i & a3, 
3 mi Number of contributors other than i in G
3• 
The equilibrium condition requires that each player be 
indifferent between contributing and not contributing. The expected 
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payoff if i does not contribute equals the value of the good (1) times 
the probability that contributions by others are sufficient to produce 
the good. That is, 
contributing equals 
for a member i of G3, the expected payoff of not
prob (m� > w-k) • 1 --
Similarly, the expected payoff to i of contributing is 
3 prob(mi 2. w-k--1) -- c 
The equilibrium condition for each member of G3 (mixers) requires that 
the player be indifferent between contributing and not contributing. 
That is 
prob (m� 2. w-k) 1 
3 prob(mi 2. w-k--1) -- c 
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The equilibrium condition for each member of G1 (contributors) is that 
the payoff to contributing is at least as great as the payoff to not 
contributing. That is 
3 3 prob(m 2. w-k+l) i prob(m 2. w-k) -- c.
Similarly, for members of G2 (noncontributors) we have 
3 3 prob(m 2 w-k) 2 prob(m 2 w-k--1) -- c. 
The three conditions outlined above can be written in 
algebraic form, in terms of w, j, k and M, These are given below 
(Gl) 
(G2) 
<a3> 
c i Prob(m3 = w-k) = (M-- k--j)q w-k(l-- q)M-- w-j w-k 
c l Prob(m3 = w-k--1) = (M--k--j)qw-k--l(l-- )M--w-j+l w-k--1 q 
c = Prob(m� = w-k--1) = (M--k--j--l)qw-k--1(1-- )M-- w-j 1 w-k� q 
For some combinations of c, j, k, w, M, (1.1)--(1.3) cannot 
simultaneously be satisfied for any value of q between 0 and 1. 
Characterizing which types of equilibria exist is equivalent to 
(1.1) 
(1.2) 
(1.3) 
characterizing when (1.1)--(1.3) can be simultaneously satisfied for 
some value(s) of q between 0 and 1. For completeness, we note three 
special cases in which (1,1)--(1.3) need not all be satisfied, If 
k = 0, then only (1.2) and (1�3) need be satisfied; if j = 0 only 
(1.1) and (1.3) apply and if k j = 0 only (1.3) applies. 
Thus, the set of above equalities and inequalities determines 
the equilibrium correspondence for the no refund game. That is, for 
any (c, w, M), (1,1)-(1,3) together determine the set of triples 
((k•, j•, q•)} which are Nash equilibria to the no refund game. We now 
proceed to prove a few simple facts about this equilibrium 
correspondence. 
Definition: We say (k, j, w, M) is admissible if 
0.{JiM- w 
oit£w - 1
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The reason for this definition is straightforward. If j ) M - w, then 
it is impossible to have enough contributors to produce the good, so 
in equilibrium clearly lo31 = o .  If k L w, then the good is  always
produced, so, again lo31 = O. The last condition is obvious.
Proposition 2: If (k, j, w, M) is admissible then, for any value of 
c e (0, 1) there are at most 2 values of q such that (k, j, q) is an 
equilibrium. If either k > 0 or j ) 0, then there is at most one such 
value of q. 
Proof: Differentiating (1.3) with respect to q gives 
c' ( q) 
It follows that c(q) is single peaked and 
> 
c, ( q) 0 if - w-k-1 q ) M-j-k-1 
The first part of the proposition follows immediately. To prove the 
second part of the proposition, first assume k > O. From (1.1) and
(1.3) we have 
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_rL q 2 M-k-j (2) 
Since w-k M-k-j 
w-k-l we haveM-j-k-1' 
w-k-1 l > q > M-j-k-1' 
However, in this region c(q) is monotonic, so there is at most 
one value of q satisfying equation (1.3) and inequality (2), Next, 
suppose j > O. In this case, we have, from (1.2) and (1, 3) 
w-k-1 
q 2 M-j-k-1 (3) 
A similar argument to the one above demonstrates that again there is 
at most one q satisfying (1.3) and inequality (3). If both k > 0 and 
j > 0, then only (1.3) and (2) are binding since (2) implies (3). 
Corollary 2,1: If (k, j,w, M) are admissible, there exists a (k, j, q) 
equilibrium if and only if c i cmax' where
c max ( 
M-j-1) ( w=-1) 
w-1 Ol-w-j) M-w-j 
rl ( . M-j-1 M-rl) 
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if k 0 (4) 
(M-k-j-1) (w-k) 
w-k (M-w-i-l )
M-w-j-1 
w-k (M-k-j-l)M-k-j-1
if k > 0 (4 ') 
Proof: From the single-peakedness of c(q) established in proposition 
2, (4) is the largest value of c for which (1.3) has a solution in 
q e (0,1). If k > 0, then (1.3) and the additional restriction (2) 
together imply (4 '). 
This corollary is of particular interest since it specifies a 
closed form solution for the maximum cost which admits a (k,j,q) 
equilibrium. 
Corollary 2.2: For fixed (k,j,w,M) admissible with k ) 0 or j ) 0 and 
-1 c � cmax' Q'(c) < 0, where we define Q(c) = c (q).
Proof: Immediate from proposition 2. 
This corollary states that the equilibrium probability of 
contributing for members of o3 is a decreasing function of cost.
In the no refund game with "small" M and fixed w, multiple 
equilibria abound. There are different equilibria corresponding to 
variation in the parameters k and j. And, for k,j fixed, there 
typically are multiple equilibria corresponding to permutation of 
membership in the three groups o1• a2• and o3• The multiple
equilibrium problem is less troubling for very large groups. 
cmax � 
From Corollary 2.1 , note that 
c max = (
�l-k-j-1) Cw--k-
l)w-k-l (M-w-k-�
)M-w-k-j 
w-k-1 (M-k-j-l)M-k-J-1
1 0  
I n  turn, cmax 
is just the binomial probability of obtaining exactly w-k-1 successes 
in M-j-k-1 trials when the success probability, p, is �;J���l. It is
a well-known result that the probability of obtaining any exact number 
of successes goes to zero as the number of trials becomes large as 
long as p is bounded strictly3 away from 0 and 1. Hence, if we take a 
limit of c (M,k,j,w) in such a way that p = .;:-/�\ is bounded max - -
between 0 and 1, then the limit will equal O. One way to do this, for 
example is to fix any admissible (w0,M0,j0,k0,). Obtain a sequence 
{(w ,M ,j ,k ))
"' 
1 by letting w = nw0, M n n n n n= n n n M0, j = nj 0, k = nk0•n n 
-n "' This sequence generates another sequence {c
max}n=O
" It is easily 
-n shown that lim c = O. In other words, if we eliminate equilibria
n -7"' 
max 
in this way, the1only equilibria which are supported by positive 
contribution costs for all n are the pure strategy equilibria. These 
either have no contributors or just enough contributors to produce the 
good. If the public good is produced at all, it is produced with no 
"surplus" of contributors. By the above limiting argument, all 
(inefficient) mixed strategy equilibria seem to disappear in large 
populations. 4 
We conclude this section with an extended example in which we 
derive the entire set of Nash equilibria. 
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A Numerical Example. 
Let M = 4, w 2' c . 096; 
Pure Strategy Eauilibria: There are (�) = 6 equilibria with k 
and one equilibrium where no one contributes. 
Equilibria With Mixed Strategies: For k 
. 096 
j 
There are two solutions, q = . 8  and q - .0343. 
0, we have 
Note that in one of these solutions, the expected number of 
j 
contributors is 3.2, substantially greater than the efficient number 
of 2.0. In the other, expected contributors are : .4, less than the 
efficient number. Thus, if mixed strategies were used, we might 
expect to see both underprovision and overprovision of the public 
service. Such results were reported by Simmons et al. (1981) and van 
de Kragt et al. (1982). 
If j = 0, for this example, the only admissible value for k > 0 is 
k = 1. Thus, 
. 096 
The only solution such that 0 ( q ( 1 is q: . 690. Since .690 ) 1/3, 
we have verified that (2) is satisfied. The expected number of 
contributors is 3.07. 
2 
Similarly, with k O the only admissible value for j > 0 is 
Thus, 
.096 
The two solutions are q . 949 and 
q . 051 • 
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1. 
However, only q • 949 > 1/2 satisfies (3). Expected contributors are 
2 .BS. 
The only remaining case is k j 1. Thus, 
.096 2 0 (0)q (1-q) or q , 904. 
Since .904 > 1/2, (2) is satisfied. 
We find that the expected number of contributors in 
equilibrium can vary from 0 to 3. 2. Thus, experimental findings that 
there are more than the efficient number of contributors cannot be 
taken as evidence that players are not self-interested Nash players. 
Indeed, equilibria with j = 0 are consistent with occasionally 
observing every player contributing! 
Case II. Refund (R) • 
o .  
Proposition 3. The pure strategy Nash equilibria include all the 
equilibria specified in Proposition 1 and, if w > 2, equilibria where 
k, 0 < k i w - 2, individuals contribute and the others do not.
Proof: Obvious. The additional equilibria result simply because a 
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player is indifferent between contributing and not contributing when 
the player is not pivotal and the public good is not provided. 
�. The pure strategy Nash equilibria of0 R are a superset of 
those of R. Of course, under R only the efficient (m=w) equilibria 
are strong in the sense that, if any player deviates from equilibrium, 
that player is strictly worse off, 
We believe that this is what is meant by the observation of 
Simmons et .J!!. that a refund removes the fear incentive for free 
riding. The inefficient pure strategy equilibria of the R game are 
weak in the sense that any player may unilaterally change his or her 
strategy without affecting anyone's payoff. In contrast, both types 
(m=w and m=O) are strong under R. Nonetheless, even when only strong
equilibria are predicted, the Nash predictions contain m=w for both 
types. Consequently, one would not be astonished that there is little 
difference in experimental results. 
lib. lo3 I I= o. 
The equilibrium conditions analogous to (1,1)-(1.3) are: 
c i 
3 Prob(m =w-k) 
Prob(m32.w-k) 
(M-k-j) q
w-k (l-q)M-w-j 
w-k 
1·1-k-j 
L (!1-�-j) qt(l-q)M-k-j-t t=w-k 
(5.1) 
3 , Prob(m =w-k-1) c '-
3 
c = 
Prob(m 2.w-k-1) 
Prob(m�=w-k-1) 1 
3 Prob(mi2.w-k-1) 
(M-k-j) w-k-1(1- )M-w-j+l w-k-1 q q 
!1-�-j !1-k-j t(l )M-k-j-tL < t > q -q t=w-k-1 
(!l-k-j-1) w-k-l(l- )M-w-j - k-1 q q 
!l-k-j-1 . 1)- (!l-k;J-l)qt(l-q)M-k-j-1-t 
t=ih-1 
Note that, in each expression, the numerator is the 
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(S.2) 
(S,3) 
probability of being pivotal, while the denominator is the probability 
of winning (the good is produced) if the player contributes. In the 
no refund case, in contrast, the denominator is effectively one or the 
probability of winning or losing. The refund has the effect of 
discarding the losing events. 
Proposition 4. If, for given c, (S.3) has a solution, the constraints 
(S.l) and (S.2) are never binding. 
Proof: Algebraic manipulations leads us to rewrite (S.1)-(S.3) as 
c i 
c 2. 
c = 
!I- j t 
1 + [ n (!1-w- i+l-r) (_g_) t 
t=l r=l w-k+r 1-q 
!1-w- j t 
1 + [ n (!1-w- j+2-r) (_g_) t 
t=l r=l w-k+r-l l-q 
+ 1/(!1
-k-j) (_g_)M-w-j+l 
-1
w-k-1 1-q 
-1 
1 + fl (M-w- i+l-r) (_g_) t 
!1-t:i j t -1 
=l r=l w-k+r-1 1-q 
( s .1,) 
( s .2,) 
( s .3.) 
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Since w-k+r > w-k+r-1 and M-w-j+l-r < M-w-j+2-r, we have that 
every term in the summation in (5 , 2 •') is greater than every tern1 in 
(S.3') which is greater than every term in (S.l'), The extra term in 
(S.2 ') is positive. The proposition now follows directly. 
The following definition rules out the case of j = M - w. We 
return to this later, 
Definition: (k,j,w,H) is admissible for R if it is admissible and 
j < H - w. 
Since equation (S.3') characterizes the entire set of 
equilibria for R when some players use mixed strategies, we proceed by 
analyzing the properties of that equation. The first observation, 
stated below in proposition S and its corollary, is that if (k,j ,w,1.1) 
are admissible for R, then a unique (k,j,q) equilibrium exists for 
each value of c between 0 and 1. In contrast, for R, equilibria 
existed only for c i cmax' This result, together with propositions 2 
and 3, establishes that there are "more" equilibria under R than under 
R, 
Proposition S: In (S, 3'), c is a continuously differentiable function 
of q on (0,1). Furthermore, in this interval: 
(a) c ' ( q) < 0 
(b) c(O) = 1 
( c) lim c ( q) 
q-71 
0 
Proof: These properties of c(q) are easily obtained from (S.3'). 
Corollary 5,!: The function c(q) is invertible on (0,1) and the 
16 
inverse function Q(c) specifies the unique equilibrium value of q at c 
for given admissible k,j,w, Furthermore: 
(a) Q'(c) < 0 
(b) Q(l) = 0 
(c) lim Q(c) 1 
c -70 
The next proposition states that there is greater contribution 
under R than under R, at least in the corresponding mixed strategy
equilibria. A somewhat different statement of the proposition is that 
for every mixed R equilibrium, there exists a corresponding (in the 
sense that there are the same number of pure strategy contributors and 
noncontributors) mixed R equilibrium with a greater expected number of 
contributors. 
Proposition 6: For fixed admissible k,j,w,M, and 
0 <. c i cmax('k,j,w,M), Q(c) is strictly greater than the equilibrium 
mixing probability under R. (If k = j = 0, Q( c) is strictly greater
than both equilibrium probabilities under R.) 
Proof: Follows directly from 1, 3, S.3, and corollary S, l. 
Under R we established that no mixed strategy equilibria could 
be supported for large values of M,w,j,k. This is no longer the case 
under R, as proposition S states. However, there is a disappearance 
of these equilibria in a slightly different sense. The following 
proposition establishes for R that when M,w,j,k grow proportionately,5 
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Q(c) converges to 0 pointwise on (0,1). That is each mixer acts 
essentially just like a noncontributor, 
Proposition 7: Fix Mo. Choose admissible wo,jo,ko. Denote by Q(c;n)
the equilibrium probability of voting function for parameters 
0 0 0 0 (nM ,nw ,nj ,nk ) • Then for c e (0,1) 
lim Q (c;n) 
n�oo 
0 
f!.QQ!: In the proof, we establish that the inverse function converges 
to zero, By monotonicity of the inverse function, this establishes 
that Q (c;n) converges pointwise to O. The numerator in (5.3) is the 
binomial probability of obtaining exactly w-k-1 successes in M-k-j-1 
trials with fixed probability q. As n � 00, this probability goes to 
zero. On the other hand, the denominator is l-F(nw-nk-nj-2; nM, q). 
This "tail" approaches a finite 1 imit (given by the Normal 
approximation) as n � oo, Hence, c � O. 
The Numerical Example Continued 01 = 4, w = 2)
Since w = 2, there are few differences between R and R for 
this example. The pure strategy R equilibria are identical to those 
for R as ere the mixed strategy equilibia for k=l. 
When k=O and j=O, q = ,802, very close to the R value of ,800, 
For k=O and j=l, q=,9496, again very close to the R value of .9494. 
Finally, when k=O and j=2, there are no mixed strategy equilibria. 
Discussion. For this example, the R and R solutions are remarkably 
similar in both pure and mixed strategies, The only substantial 
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differences occur for k=O, when there are no "committed" contributors. 
Even here, the low q solutions for R have q so low that enormous 
amounts of experimental data would be needed to distinguish these 
equilibria from the pure strategy equilibrium with no one 
contributing. Similarly, it would be difficult to discriminate 
between R and R as to their high q mixed strategy predictions. In
this particular game, end perhaps more generally, it will be difficult 
to determine, on the basis of e smell number of experiments, whether 
the refund rule affects the supply of public goods. 
Another Example 
We now analyze the experimental games of Simmons et al. 
(1981). They had M=7 and w=3 or S. Reperameterizing their payoffs in 
our 0-1 metric, c=l/2. Tables 1 end 2 show the mixed strategy 
equilbria. Mixed strategy equilibria proliferate here for the refund 
condition. Consequently, even if subjects were "at equilibrium" there 
could be considerable scatter in the data, Moreover, mixed strategy 
equilibria are not entirely ruled out with no refund, even with this 
relatively high cost. The R probabilities are again close to certain 
R probabilities. A probability of 1/2 occurs in both conditions for 
both w values. For w=3, the k=O, j=4, R probability is .71, while the 
k=O, j=3 probability for R is .75. For w=S, the k=O, j=2 R 
probability is , 84, while the k=O, j=l probability for R is , 8 3. As 
in our earlier examples, it is not easy to distinguish between the R 
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Table 2. 
Table 1. 
Analysis of Mixed Strategy Equilibria, M=7, w=S, c=l/2 
0 c > 
k 1 c > 
Analysis of Mixed· Strategy Equilibria, M=7, w=3, c=l/2 
0 1 
c c > c max max 
c c > c max max 
c > 
c > 
R 
j 
2 
c max 
c max 
3 4 
c > c q = .71 max 
c > c c > c max max 
0 
1 
k 2 
. so Not c > c c > c c > c q = Admissible max max max 2 3 
0 1 
0 q = .34 q = .42 q = 
k 1 q = .26 q = .33 q = 
2 q = .16 q = .21 q = 
R 
j 
2 
.S4 
.44 
.29 
q 
q 
q 
3 
= .7S 
= .67 
= . so 
4 
4 
Not 
Admissible 
0 
Not 
Admissible 1 
Not 
Admissible 
k 2 
3 
4 
0 
c > c c > max 
c > c c > max 
c > c c > max 
c > c c > max 
> c c q = max 
0 
q = .66 q = 
q = .60 q = 
q = .54 q = 
q = .44 q = 
q = .29 q = 
R 
j 
1 
c max 
c max 
c max 
c max 
.50 
R 
j 
1 
.83 
.80 
.75 
.67 
.50 
2 
q = .84 
c > c max 
c > c max 
c > c max 
Not 
Admissible 
2 
Not 
Admissible 
Not 
Admissible 
Not 
Admissible 
Not 
Admissible 
Not 
Admissible 
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and R conditions simply by observing the number of contributors across 
trials. 
Inspection of Tables 1 and 2 suggests: 
Proposition 8 ,  The equilibrium probability q is increasing i n  j and 
decreasing in k in R games. 
Proof: 
1, Increasing k for fixed j makes every term in the product in 
(S, 3 ') larger. 
decrease. 
Thus, for fixed c, _g_l and hence q must -q 
2, Increasing j for fixed k drops one positive term from the sum 
in (S, 3') and makes every term in the product smaller. 
Hence, for fixed c, q must increase. 
Proposition 9. If w < M, M 2 2, there exists at least one mixed 
strategy equilibrium to every R game for all c e (0,1) and to every R 
game for all c e (0,1/2). 
Proof: 
1. Consider j = M-w-1, k = w-1.
2. Then from ( 1.3) or (S.3), q = 1-c. 
3. The constraint (2) is satisfied if q 2. 1/2 or c .{ 1/2. 
Unanimity Rule. A unanimity rule, where w = M, is one extreme 
case which is of particular interest because it sharply illustrates 
this difference between the R and i rules. As others have pointed 
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out, rebates remove the "fear" motivation to free ride. Unanimity 
removes the greed motivation as well, since if w = M, there is no 
possibility of "overcontribution." This leads to a situation in which 
there is no strong motivation under the refund rule for a member of 
the group not to contribute. In fact, consider the case j = M-w. 
Then, it is easy to show that, with refund, the only equilibria are 
those with k = M-j and, hence, IG31 = O. There are no mixers. Indeed, 
if M = w, so there is a unanimity rule, unanimous contribution 
constitutes a dominant strategy equilibrium (i.e. regardless what 
other members do, each member has a best response of contributing). 
With no refund the "fear" incentive remains, and there are exactly 
three Nash equilibria, none of which is a dominant strategy 
equilibrium. These equilibria are stated below. 
Proposition 10, If w=M > 2, there are only three equilibria in the R 
game: 1. Pure strategy equilibrium with m=O, 2, Pure strategy 
equilibrium with m=M. 3. Mixed strategy equilibrium with j=k=O and 
_ 1_ 
q = c M-1 
Proof: 
1. The pure strategy equilibria are established by proposition 1.
2. There are obviously no mixed strategy equilibria with j F O. 
_1_ 
3. If j 0, and k 0, q cM-l follows from ( 1.3). 
4. If k F 0, then (2) has q 2 (M-k)/(M-k) 1, so no other mixed 
strategy equilibrium exists. 
III. SURVEY OF EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 
Much of the experimental literature dealing with discrete 
public goods makes no attempt to control for or specify the costs 
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facing the participants. Consequently, the results are rarely germane 
to a test of our theory. A large set of these experiments were aimed 
at testing the qualitative predictions of Olson (1968) that collective 
goods were less likely to be provided and that individual contribution 
rates would fall as group size increased. 
For example, Darley and Latan6 (1968) conducted 
social-psychological experiments in which subjects were led to believe 
that an individual had had a nervous seizure and that they were in a 
group of size M, with M being set to 1, 2, or 5. The experimenters 
were interested in whether a subject reported the seizure or, in our 
terms, a w=l game. Indeed a lower proportion of subjects reported the 
seizure as group size increased. Sweeney (1974) offerred the 
completely ad hoc suggestion that the probability of reporting 
(contributions) would be given as q y/M-z, where y and z are 
arbitrary positive constants. This "law" would agree with our result 
for the pure strategy equilibrium where the frequency of contributors 
is 1/M, but it is quite distinct from the mixed strategy result that 
_1_ 
q = 1 - M- 1 c Table 3 shows that the results are reasonably 
consistent with a game-theoretic approach although the lack of 100 
percent contribution when M=l would suggest, at the least, that not 
all participants perceived the same cost. 
Variations in cost do need to be considered by analysts. 
Sweeney goes on to argue that the Darley and Latan6 results, which 
show that the probability at least one individual will contribute is 
about . 85, independent of M, is inconsistent with real-world 
observations such as the 1964 Genovese murder in New York. In that 
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case, none of 38 individuals contributed (called the police). But for 
these individuals one can not rule out that c)l which would make not 
contributing a dominant strategy. (Calling the police may be costless 
but appearing as a witness in a lengthy assualt or murder trial is 
very costly. ) 
Table 3. The Darley-Latan6 Experiments 
Group-Size 
M 
'l'o Contributors 
Actual Data 
'lb Expected 
Contributors 
Pure Strategy 
Equilibrium 
'lo Expected, 
Contributors 
Mixed Strategy 
Equilibrium 
with c=.3 
Number 
of 
Subject 
1 85 100 13 
2 62 so 70 26 
5 31 20 26 13 
Source: Adapted from Sweeney (1974), p. 268. 
Experiments that, since costs are controlled, bear directly on 
the preceeding theory are found in 34 non-repeated M=7 games reported 
by Simmons et al. (1981) and van de Kragt et al. (1982). These 
experiments consisted of 7 with w=3 and refund, 10 with w=3 and no 
refund, 7 with w=S and refund, and 10 with w=S and no refund. 
Normalizing their payoffs shows c=l/2. 
Consider the 8x4 contingency table (Table 4) that cross-
classifies the experiments by number contributing. Treating the 
experimental condition as the independent variable and denoting the 
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number contributing by a, we can list the following possible A priori 
predictions from our game-theoretic analysis. 
IP1: All pure strategy Nash equilibria are predicted. 
If w = 3 and R, a =  0, 1, or 3 
w = 3 and R, a = 0 or 3 
w = S and R, a =  0, 1, 2, 3, or S 
w = S and R, a = 0 or S 
Jl>2: All pure strategy Nash equilibrium that are not weak are 
predicted. 
If w = 3 and R, a = 3 
w = 5 and R, a = 0 or 3 
w S and R, a = 5 
w = S and R, a = 0 or S 
1P3: Any outcome consistent with either a mixed or pure Nash 
equilibrium is predicted,6 
If w = 3 and R, a =  0, 1, 2, 3, 4, S, 6, or 7 
If w 3 and R, a =  0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 
If w = S and R, a = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, S, 6, or 7 
If w 5 and R, a =  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 
To evaluate these predictions, we use the V ( -m < V i 1) 
measure of predictions success (Hildebrand et al. , 1977). 7 We also 
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use the U (0 � U � 1) measure of prediction precision. (Since n>2 
must make at least as many errors as IP l, IP2 is more precise than 
IP1• Similarly, IP1 is more precise than IP3. )  The results appear in 
Table S. All V's are positive, but we would reject the null 
hypothesis that V = 0 using an . OS level of significance only for Jl>2 , 
However, the V value of . 09 for IP2 is quite low. The value for IP3, 
.32, is more substantial, but the precision of the prediction is too 
low to permit the application of the asymptotic sampling theory 
developed by Hildebrand et al. ( 1977). 
Simmons et al. (1981) believed there would be more 
contributions with a refund because the "fear" motivation for free-
riding has been eliminated. Were these authors to have combined their 
social-psychological concerns with game theory, they might have 
arrived at the proposition that under no refund either the efficient 
Nash equilibrium number of contributors or fewer result while with a 
refund the efficient number or more contribute. This leads to: 
IP 4: Efficiency with "fear" considerations 
If w = 3 and R, a =  3, 4, S, 6, or 7 
w = 3 nnd R, a =  0, 1, 2, or 3 
w = S and R, a =  S, 6, or 7 
w = S and R, a =  1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 
This proposition, as an � priori prediction, would be 
reasonably sucessful, since V = . 32 and we strongly reject the null 
hypothesis of V = o.8 Despite this success, precision is modest 
(U = . 399). None of the four predictions represents a strong 
explanation of the experimental outcomes. 
Table 4. 
The Simmons Experiments 
Number of Conditions 
Contributors w=3 , R  w=3 , R  w=5, R w=5 , R  
0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 
2 0 2 0 0 
3 2 3 1 1 
4 2 1 2 5 
5 2 1 3 2 
6 1 1 1 2 
7 0 1 0 0 
Total 7 10 7 10 I N=34 
27 28 
Table 5. 
Prediction Analysis 
,. 
Estimated Estimated U 
,. 
'V std. error 
IP 1 .051 , 035 . 713 
IP 2 .094 . 039 . 779 
IP 3 .320 , 076 , 130 
IP 4 .336 . 002 , 399 
Note: 1P 4 is significant at . 01 level, IP2 at , 05, In
IP3, total errors are too few to apply the asymptotic tests.
What may underlie the variations in Simmons' experiments is 
the multiplicity of Nash equilibria, For example, in the w =  3 game, 
there are 35 efficient pure strategy equilibrium, and every player is 
a contributor in 15 such equilibria. Given the one shot character of 
the games, participants have few guides to action. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzed two different voluntary contribution 
schemes for the provision of a discrete public good by modelling these 
schemes as two different rules for a one-team participation game. The 
Nash equilibria in the two games were compared and contrasted, for 
games played by both small groups and very large groups. The results 
for small groups were then applied to an analysis of experimental data 
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on free riding behavior. The a priori predictions of the game 
theoretic model were only moderately successful in explaining the 
experimental outcomes. We believe there are at least two reasons for 
this. First, because of the presence of multiple equilibria, the 
range of possible observed behavior consistent with equilibrium 
behavior was very wide. Second, since the games were played only 
once, subjects had no chance to learn about the behavior of other 
players. Because of the multiplicity of equilibria, learning or some 
form of coordination is probably very important (possibly necessary) 
for the attainment of a Nash equilibrium. In light of these extreme 
coordination problems, we find it remarkable that the game theoretic 
predictions were as successful as they turned out to be. 
While we did not apply the results for large groups to 
experimental or field data, a number of interesting theoretical 
results emerged. First, for large groups, the two rules differed only 
in the predicted pure strategy equilibria, because, under both rules, 
mixed strategy equilibria "disappear. " This disappearance takes two 
different forms. Either the mixing probabilities converge to 0 or 1 
("essentially" pure strategies) or mixed strategy equilibria are not 
supported for positive costs. 
For both large and small groups, it was found that equilibria 
under the refund rule will lead to greater expected contribution than 
equilibria under the no refund rule. However, this difference does 
not seem to be as large as previous researchers have suggested. This 
rather surprising result has been borne out by experimental data. 
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The results of this paper for the no refund rule can be 
readily combined with those for two team games reported in Palfrey and 
Rosenthal ( 1982). There, given majority rule, w was, essentially, 
zero. Expected participation with large number of players equalled 
either zero or w + twice the size of the minority. In the one team 
games with no refund, the minority has size zero, and thus expected 
participation is also either zero or w + twice the size of the 
minority. The result of "zero or w + twice the minority" should 
generalize to two team games with supramajority voting. 
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FOOTNOTES 
• We thank Randy Simmons for sharing his data. We have benef itted 
from discussion with Edward Green, Richard JlcKelvey, and John 
Orbell. This work was supported by NSF Grant SES79-17576. 
1. In Palfrey and Rosenthal (1982), one variant gave a payoff of 1/2
to everyone even if no one volunteered to provide the good. In 
the one team case, this variant does not apply. 
2, Chamberlin (1974) and McGuire (1974) have examined a rule similar 
3. 
4. 
to the no refund rule for the provision of continuous rather than 
discrete public goods, 
By bounded strictly away from 0 and 1, we mean that there exist 
constants A and B such that 0 < A < p < B < 1. 
Not quite all mixed strategy equilibria disappear in large 
populations. A few special cases persist. To see this, suppose 
we take limits as above except we let kn 0 for all n and have 
j 1 Th h !. 1· n th 1 · · t d f n = mn - wn - • en cmax approac es e e 1m1 , an or 
all ce(O,l ), Q(c) converges to 1. Thus with large populations, e 
for relatively low cost, these equilibria survive, but mixers 
behave almost as if they are using a pure strategy of voting, It 
is tedious, but straightforward to prove more generally that in 
all those mixed strategies equilibria which can be supported by 
positive costs in large populations, Q(c) converge to either 0 or 
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1. Hence, in a different sense, these mixed strategies 
"disappear" as well. 
S. If limits are taken "nonproportionately," we find a few 
exceptions similar to the example given in n. 4. 
6. From Tables 1 and 2, we note that the presence of an equilibrium 
with j=k=O implies that all outcomes can occur under R. Under R, 
the predictions result from noting that at least 3 people must 
abstain with w=3 and at least one must abstain with w=S. 
7. A general proportionate-reduction-in-error measure, Vis analogous 
to R2• In fact, R2 is a special case of V (see Hildebrand et 
8. 
al., 1981.) Because the experiments controlled the independent 
variable, we have used the variance expression found in 
Hildebrand et al., 1977, p. 202. 
It is interesting that Simmons et al. concluded that the value 
of w a�d the refund conditions had no influence on contributions. 
These authors used a standard chi-square test which is equivalent 
to testing the .l!. priori theory "the data are not statistically 
independent." This test fails to exploit the directionality of .l!. 
priori theory like JP 1 - JP 4• The chi-square test is thus very 
unlikely to reject the null hypothesis. 
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